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ABSTRACT
Models leak information about their training data. This enables
attackers to infer sensitive information about their training sets,
notably determine if a data sample was part of the model’s training
set. The existing works empirically show the possibility of these
tracing (membership inference) attacks against complex models
with a large number of parameters. However, the attack results are
dependent on the specific training data, can be obtained only after
the tedious process of training the model and performing the attack,
and are missing anymeasure of the confidence and unused potential
power of the attack. A model designer is interested in identifying
which model structures leak more information, how adding new
parameters to the model increases its privacy risk, and what is the
gain of adding new data points to decrease the overall information
leakage. The privacy analysis should also enable designing the most
powerful inference attack.
In this paper, we design a theoretical framework to analyze the
maximum power of tracing attacks against high-dimensional mod-
els, with the focus on probabilistic graphical models. We provide a
tight upper-bound on the power (true positive rate) of these attacks,
with respect to their error (false positive rate). The bound, as it
should be, is independent of the knowledge and algorithm of any
specific attack, as well as the values of particular samples in the
training set. It provides a measure of the potential leakage of a
model given its structure, as a function of the structure complexity
and the size of training set.
1 INTRODUCTION
Howmuch is the privacy risk of releasing high-dimensional models
which are trained on sensitive data? We focus on measuring infor-
mation leakage of models about their training data, using tracing
(membership inference) attacks. Given the released model and a
target data sample, the adversary aims at inferring whether or not
the target sample was a member of the training set. We use the term
tracing attack and membership inference attack interchangeably.
The attack is evaluated based on its power (true positive rate), and
its error (false positive rate), in its binary decisional task.
Tracing attacks have been extensively studied for summary sta-
tistics, where independent statistics (e.g., mean) of attributes of
high-dimensional data are released. Although initial works showed
the existence of powerful tracing attacks [10], more recent work
provided theoretical frameworks to analyze the upper bound on the
power of these inference attacks [20], and their robustness to noisy
statistics [7]. The theoretical analysis helps reason about the major
causes of information leakage and their influence on the power of
the membership inference attacks. However, the analysis is limited
to simple models such as product distributions.
Advanced machine learning algorithms, such as deep neural
networks, have recently been tested against tracing attacks. In
the black-box setting, the attacker can only observe predictions of
the model. The attack involves training inference models that can
distinguish between members and non-members from the predic-
tions that the target model produces [21]. The attacks are tested
against deep neural networks as well as machine-learning-as-a-
service platforms, and their accuracy is shown to be related to their
generalization error [21, 23]. In the white-box setting, the attacker
obtains the parameters of the model, and decides that the target
sample is a member if the gradients of the loss with respect to the
model’s parameters computed on the target data sample are aligned
with the model’s parameters [17]. Large models are empirically
shown to be more vulnerable to the attack, even if they have a
better generalization performance. These attacks highlight the sus-
ceptibility of high-dimensional neural networks to tracing attacks.
However, their analysis is limited to empirical measurements of
the attack success on particular data sets.
Contributions. Using the above-mentioned existing methods,
it is possible to reason theoretically about tracing attacks, yet only
for extremely simple models (independent statistics). In parallel,
it is possible to perform empirical tracing attacks against com-
plex models (deep neural networks), yet without much theoretical
analysis. In this paper, we aim at closing this gap by providing a
theoretical framework for reasoning about tracing attacks against
high dimensional models, i.e. models with many parameters. With
this framework, one can compute the power and error of an attack,
compute the tradeoff between power and error for various attack
choices, design the most powerful attack for a given error, and also
determine the elements of a released model that contribute to the
power/error of the attacker. Our focus is on probabilistic graphical
models, which are very general statistical models that capture the
correlations among attributes of data, and are among fundamental
models for machine learning, and the basis of many deep learning
models via e.g. restricted Boltzmann machines.
We use the likelihood ratio test (LR test) as the foundation of our
tracing attack [20]. This enables us to design the most powerful
attack against any probabilistic model. Thus, for any given error,
there exist no other attack strategy that can achieve a higher power.
Our objective is not to empirically evaluate the performance of at-
tacks (even the theoretically strongest one) on trained models. We
compute the maximum achievable power of tracing attacks.
This upper bound can be used as a measure to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of different attack algorithms by comparing their achieved
power to the bound for any false positive error.
Our objective is to identify the elements of a model that cause
membership information leakage, and measure their influence. We
prove that, for a given model structure, the potential leakage of the
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model (the leakage that corresponds to the most powerful attack
for any given error) is proportional to the square root of model’s
complexity (as the number of its independent parameters), and is in-
versely proportional to the square root of size of training set. Thus,
the theoretical bound enables us to quantify the potential leak-
age of a model before even learning the parameters of the
model on that structure. This can be used to efficiently compare
different model structures based on their susceptibility to tracing
attacks. This is of significant value when choosing among various
model structures that have comparable utilities. The theoretical
bound can quantify the power that the attack gains/loses if a new
attribute is added/removed from the data, or when the model re-
quires capturing/removing the correlation between certain set of
attributes. It also determines the size of the training set for a very
high-dimensional model that leaks a similar amount of information
as a small model leaks on a small set of data.
We evaluate our framework against real (sensitive) data: location
check-ins, purchase history, and genome data. We empirically show
that the upper bound is tight, and power of the likelihood ratio
test attacker is extremely close to the bound, for any false positive
error. In the experiments, we show that the bound is the same for
two model structures of similar dimension, regardless of how the
structures are constructed (e.g., using an optimal structure learning
algorithm, or totally at random). We also show that independent
data samples from the general population are enough to build a
strong attack, and the attacker is not required to learn about the
true generative model for his dataset.
2 PROBABILISTIC GRAPHICAL MODELS
In a multi-dimensional space, where the probability distribution
over each dimension can be represented by a random variable, prob-
abilistic graphical models capture the probability distribution over
the space [15]. Probabilistic graphical models have many applica-
tions in machine learning, in a variety of domains. They are also
the foundation of many advanced machine models, such as the
restricted Boltzman machines (used in deep learning).
Probabilistic graphical models make use of a graph-based repre-
sentation to encode the dependencies and conditional independence
between the random variables. Each node Xi in a graph G is a ran-
dom variable, and the edges represent the dependencies. Bayesian
networks and Markov random fields are the most common types of
probabilistic graphical models. In this paper, we focus on Bayesian
networks. However, our attack framework is easily applicable to
Markov random fields.
In the Bayesian networks, the model structure is a directed
acyclic graph, and the model ⟨G,θ⟩ enables factoring the joint
probability over the random variables. Given all its parents in the
graph, a random variable becomes conditionally independent of
other random variables. Therefore, the joint distribution can be
factored as follows.
Pr[X1,X2, · · · ,Xm ] =
m∏
i=1
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ], (1)
where PaGXi ;θ is the parent random variables ofXi . The parameters
of the model encode the conditional probabilities.
We define the complexity C of a Bayesian network ⟨G,θ⟩ with
discrete random variables as the number of independent parameters
used to define its probability distribution. Let V (X ) be the number
of distinct values that a random variable X can take. For each
conditional probability Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ], we need |V (Pa
G
Xi
)|(|V (Xi )|−
1) independent parameters. Thus, the total complexity of a model
is:
C(⟨G,θ⟩) =
m∑
i=1
|V (PaGXi )|(|V (Xi )| − 1). (2)
As a special case, when all the attributes are binary, the model
complexity is equal to
∑m
i=1 2
|PaGXi | .
Given a multi-dimensional dataset, the training algorithm for
graphical models involve learning the structure of the model as well
as its parameters. Ideally, both the structure learning and parameter
learning need to be done using a joint optimization that maximizes
the likelihood of data points in the training set. However, due to its
high computational complexity, they are optimized in sequence. In
this section, our goal is not to provide a comprehensive overview
(see [15] if interested), but rather a brief description of the methods
for learning structure and parameters of a Bayesian network in a
systematic way.
2.1 Structure Learning
The objective is to learn the significant dependencies between ran-
dom variables, and represent them as a graph. We present an exist-
ing algorithm based on maximizing a score function that measures
how correlated different attributes are, according to the training
data [9]. For each attribute we find a set of attributes which are
highly correlated with it, yet are not significantly correlated among
themselves.
score(PaGXi ) =
∑
X j ∈PaGXi
corr (Xi ,X j )√
|PaGXi | +
∑
x j ,xk ∈PaGXi
corr (X j ,Xk )
(3)
While optimizing this score for each attribute, we need to make
sure that the graph remains acyclic. Also, to control the complexity
of the graph, we impose a condition on η, the maximum number
of parents for each node. The structure learning is an iterative and
greedy algorithm that adds parents to each node while maximizing
the score for all nodes at each iteration, subject to the constraints.
Note that the structure learning might involve expert knowledge,
and is not always totally dependent on the training data. It could
also be the result of the consensus of a community (e.g., genomi-
cists) on the correlation and dependency between attributes of a
particular type of data.
2.2 Parameter Learning
We assume a prior distribution on all possible values of the param-
eters θ , and use the training data set to update this distribution,
using a Bayesian approach.
Let Xi be the random variable for a categorical attribute. Let ®θi
be the parameters of the conditional probability Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ]. For
each assignment of values to PaGXi ;θ , we assume a prior distribution
on all the possible k-dimensional multinomial distributions. The
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Symbol Description
m Number of attributes
n Pool (training set) size
⟨G, θˆ⟩ Released Model
⟨G,θ⟩ Population Model
Xi Random variable for attribute i
xi Particular value for Xi
V (Xi ) Set of possible values of attribute i
PaGXi
Set of random variables that are parents of node Xi in G
pvi Pr(xi = 1|PaGXi = v ;θ )
pˆvi Pr(xi = 1|PaGXi = v ; θˆ )
C(G) Complexity of G (number of independent parameters)
η Maximum number of parents per node in G
L(x) Log-likelihood ratio statistic (5) for data sample x
F CDF of L(x) over the general population (under HOUT)
α Error (False Positive Rate) of LR tracing attack
β Power (True Positive Rate) of LR tracing attack
zs Quantile at level 1 − s of the Standard Normal distribution
Table 1: Notations
prior distribution for each assignment v comes from a Dirichlet
family, i.e., ®θvi ∼ Dirichlet( ®αvi ), where ®αvi is the hyper parameters
of the distribution (usually set to 1 for all dimensions, which models
a uniform prior).
Let ®cvi = [cvi1, cvi2, · · · , cvik ] include the frequency of the events
[Xi = j |PaGXi ;θ = v] in training data. We compute the posterior
distribution for ®θvi as Dirichlet( ®αvi + ®cvi ). Thus, the most likely
estimation for set of parameters ®θvi is:
θvi j =
αvi j + c
v
i j∑k
j=1(αvi j + cvi j )
. (4)
As the parameters of the Bayesian network are learned from the
training data, they might leak information about the members of
the training set.
2.3 Data Synthesis
The graphical models could be used for inference and prediction, as
well as generating synthetic data (from the underlying distribution
that they encode). Given a data setD, wewant to synthesize datasets
that are close in distribution to D. The process of generating one
synthetic dataset involves the following steps:
(1) Learn a Bayesian network ⟨G,θ⟩ from the data set D.
(2) Create a Bayesian network ⟨G ′,θ ′⟩ with G ′ = G, and θ ′
drawn from the posterior Dirichlet distribution for θ , which
was computed during parameter learning.
(3) Draw independent samples from ⟨G ′,θ ′⟩.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a set of n independentm-dimensional data samples
from a population. We refer to this set as the pool. We do not make
any assumption about the probability distribution of the data points
in the general population. Given a graphical model structure G,
the pool data is used to train a graphical model, i.e., to estimate
the parameters θˆ of the probabilistic graphicalmodel ⟨G, θˆ⟩. This
model is released. Our objective is to quantify the privacy risks of
releasing such models for the members of their training data.
Let us consider an adversary who observes the released model
⟨G, θˆ⟩. We assume that the attacker can collect a set of independent
samples from the population. We refer to this set as the reference
population. The objective of the adversary is to perform a tracing
attack (also known as the membership inference attack) against
the released model, on any target data point x : create a decision
rule that determines whether x was used in the training of the
parameters of ⟨G, θˆ⟩ or not, i.e. to classify x as being in the pool
(IN) or not (OUT).
The accuracy of tracing attack indicates the information leakage
of the model about the members of its training set. We quantify the
attacker’s success using two evaluation metrics: the adversary’s
power (the true positive rate), and his error (the false positive
rate). The power measures the conditional probability that the
attacker classifies x as IN, given that x is indeed in the pool, i.e.
Pr[IN |x ∈ pool]. The error measures the conditional probability
that the attacker classifies x as IN, given that x is not in the pool,
i.e. Pr[IN |x < pool]. It is not generally possible to maximize both
of these metrics at once, and usually there is a trade-off between
power and error. The ROC curve (Receiver Operating Characteris-
tic), which is a plot of power versus error, captures this trade-off
for an attack. Thus, the area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a single
metric for combining the two metrics and measuring the strength
of the attack. The AUC can be interpreted as the probability that a
randomly drawn data point from the pool will be assigned larger
probability of being IN than a data point randomly drawn from
outside the pool. So AUC = 1 implies that the attacker can correctly
classify all data samples as IN or OUT.
4 FRAMEWORK FOR ATTACK DESIGN
We model the decisional problem of the tracing attack as a hypoth-
esis test, as in the prior work [10, 20]. Given the released model,
the reference population, and the target data point, the adversary
aims at distinguishing between two hypothesis. Each hypothesis
describes a possible world that could have resulted in the observa-
tion of the adversary, where in one world the target data was part
of the pool, and in the other was not.
• Null hypothesis (HOUT): The pool is constructed by drawing
n independent samples from the general population. The
parameters θˆ of the model ⟨G, θˆ⟩ are trained on the pool
data. The target data x is drawn from the general population,
independently from the pool.
• Alternative hypothesis (HIN): The pool is constructed by
drawing n independent samples from the general population.
The parameters θˆ of the model ⟨G, θˆ⟩ are trained on the pool
data. The target data x is drawn from pool.
This generalizes the hypothesis test designed by Sankararaman
et al. [20], in which the released model follows a product distribu-
tion, i.e. the random variables corresponding to data attributes are
independent (equivalent to a probabilistic graphical model without
any dependency edges between the nodes).
The adversary compares the likelihood of the released model,
pool data and the target individual under each hypothesis, and
uses the likelihood ratio test to decide on the membership of the
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target data. The likelihood of the pool data is the same in both
hypothesis. Thus, the test is reduced to comparing the likelihood of
the target data x under HOUT versus HIN, given the released model.
The adversary should collect the most relevant information from
the population data that can help him distinguish between the two
hypothesis. This depends on the exact computations that led to
the released model. The parameters of the released model are the
only information that the adversary has about the pool data, and
can leverage to distinguish samples in pool from random samples
from the population. Thus, the adversary needs to replicate the
exact same computation on the entire reference population. Let θ
be the result of this computation, i.e., the parameters of model G
trained on the large reference population. The differences between
θ and θˆ is due to the influence of individual members of the pool
in the training process. This is what the attacker exploits. So, the
model ⟨G,θ⟩ learned from reference population will be used for
computing the likelihood of x under HOUT.
To further elaborate the importance of ⟨G,θ⟩, note that if the
attacker chooses a model structure that is less complex than the re-
leased model structure, then he won’t able to exploit all the released
information (in ⟨G, θˆ⟩) about the pool. Similarly, if he chooses a
model structure that is more complex than the released model, he
won’t be able to utilize the additional parameters, as the correspond-
ing statistics for the pool are not available. Hence the optimal choice
for the adversary is to compute the parameters of the released model
structure on the population data.
Finally, the log likelihood statistic is computed as follows.
L(x) = log
(
Pr[x ;HOUT]
Pr[x ;HIN]
)
= log
(
Pr[x ; ⟨G,θ⟩]
Pr[x ; ⟨G, θˆ⟩]
)
(5)
The LR test is a comparison of the log likelihood statistic L(x)
with a threshold. If L(x) ≤ threshold, then the attacker decides in
favor of HIN (rejects HOUT); otherwise, in favor of HOUT (more
precisely, in this case, he fails to reject HOUT because there is not
enough evidence to support this rejection in favor of HIN).
To determine the threshold, the attacker selects a (false positive
rate) error α that he is willing to tolerate. He then empirically
or theoretically estimates the distribution of L(x) under the null
hypothesis, using his reference population. We denote the CDF
of this distribution as F . Given α and F , the attacker computes a
threshold value F−1(α) and compares it to L(x), to decide about
rejecting the null hypothesis. This concludes the hypothesis test.
The power of the test, as defined earlier, can be expressed as
Pr[L(x) ≤ F−1(α)], computed under the alternative hypothesis,
for an individual data point x randomly drawn from the pool. In
other words, it is the fraction of pool data points that are correctly
classified by the test. By varying α , and thus the threshold F−1(α),
we can draw the ROC curve and compute the AUC metric as well.
It is worth emphasizing that according to the Neyman-Pearson
lemma [18], the LR test achieves themaximum power among all
decision rules with a given error (false positive rate). So, any other
decision rule would result in a lower AUC.
5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ATTACK ANALYSIS
Our objective is to compute the maximum power β for any false
positive error α of an adversary that observes the released model
⟨G, θˆ⟩ which has been trained on a pool of size n. In our main
result, Theorem 1, we show which combinations of α and β are
possible for the attacker, and we find the major factors that matter
for determining these combinations, as a function of the model
complexity and size of the dataset.
Theorem 1. Let β and α be the power and error of the LR test, for
the membership inference attack, respectively. Let n be the size of the
pool (model’s training set), andC(G) be the complexity of the released
probabilistic graphical model ⟨G, θˆ⟩. Then, the tradeoff between power
and error follows the the following relation:
zα + z1−β ≈
√
C(G)
n
, (6)
where zs is the quantile at level 1 − s, 0 < s < 1 of the Standard
Normal distribution.
Proof sketch. To compute β = Prpool {L(x) ≤ F−1(α)}, the
power of the LR test for the inference attack, for any error α , we
need the distribution of L(x) when x is drawn from the pool and
when x is drawn from the population. Estimating the exact distribu-
tion of L(x) is a hard problem. Our approach is to approximate the
distributions of L(x), through computing its moments E(Lk ),k > 0.
To approximate the distribution using its moments, we use an es-
tablished statistical principle for fitting a distribution with known
moments: the maximum-entropy principle. This principle states
that the probability distribution which best represents the current
state of knowledge is the one with largest entropy [12, 13].
To simplify the computation of the moments, we take advantage
of the Bayesian decomposition to split this L(x) as sum of simpler
terms, one term for each attribute Xi . We start by expanding (5) to
give the following expression for L(x):
L(x) = log
(
Pr[x ; ⟨G,θ⟩]
Pr[x ; ⟨G, θˆ⟩]
)
= log ©­«
∏m
i=1 Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ]∏m
i=1 Pr[Xi |PaGXi ; θˆ ]
ª®¬
=
m∑
i=1
log ©­«
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ]
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ; θˆ ]
ª®¬ (7)
where the Xi are the attributes of the data point x , which is now
a random variable as it is drawn from the pool (or population), as
just mentioned. We define Li as the contribution of attribute Xi to
the likelihood ratio L. Hence the value of Li can be calculated as:
Li = log
©­«
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ]
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ; θˆ ]
ª®¬ (8)
We calculate the first two moments of L(x) for our approxima-
tion. The mean and variance of L(x) are µ0 = C2n ,σ 20 = Cn under
the null hypothesis and µ1 = − C2n ,σ 21 = Cn under the alternative
hypothesis (see proof in Section 5.2). For a known mean µ and
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variance σ 2, the max-entropy distribution that matches the target
distribution is a Gaussian N (µ,σ 2). In evaluation section 6.2, we
show that approximating the distribution of L(x) using just its first
two moments sufficient to calculate accurate bounds on the attack
power. We show this by comparing our theoretical bound with the
empirically observed maximum power for any error.
Given this approximation, and the computed mean and variance,
the relationship between power β , and error α is
µ0 − zασ0 = µ1 − zβσ1 (9)
where zs is the quantile at level 1− s, 0 < s < 1 of the standard nor-
mal distribution. This equation can be derived by equating quantiles
at level β , α in the pool and population distribution respectively.
Substituting µ0,σ0, µ1,σ1 into (9), we derive the main result. □
We observe that the centers (means) of L(x) under the null and al-
ternative hypotheses are separated by a distance of Cn . The overlap
between the distributions is determined by variance of the statis-
tic, and the amount of the overlap between the two distributions
determines the power β = Prpool {L(x) ≤ F−1(α)} for any error α .
Our result generalizes that of Sankararaman et al. [20] on releas-
ing independent marginals. In their case, the released graph has
no edges and nodes are binary variables. The complexity of such a
graph is equal to the number of nodesm. Hence, for independent
marginals we recover Sankararaman et al’s relation:
zα + z1−β =
√
m
n
. (10)
5.1 Insights on power, error, complexity and
pool size
The first insight from Theorem 1 is that, for a constant complexity
C and pool size n, the attacker cannot simultaneously improve the
error and the power. Decreasing the error means increasing the
threshold, which would necessarily decrease the power.
Secondly, we can observe and quantify the effect of releasing a
more complex model. Releasing more parameters helps the attacker,
and we also see that e.g. quadrupling C(G) would double the sum
zα + z1−β , thus reducing the error or increasing the power or both.
The amount of improvement depends on how large the sum already
is and there are diminishing returns.
In contrast, increasing the pool size n has the opposite effect to
increasing C: the attack performance becomes worse. This makes
sense, as a larger pool is more similar to (has more overlap with)
the population, so it is more difficult for the attacker to distinguish
between them.
It is also possible to see whether a heuristic attack can be im-
proved by comparing its error and power to the ones implied by
the main theorem for a given complexity and pool size. From the
heuristic attack’s error and power, we can compute the correspond-
ing Standard Normal quantiles and compare their sum to
√
C(G)
n .
If the sum is far from the bound, then the attack can be improved.
From a defender’s point of view, we can quantify the maximum
leakage associated with releasing various models without having
to train each model andwithout having to perform any attack. We
can reason about the ultimate/maximum power of the attacker, e.g.
one with perfect knowledge about the population, so as to guide
our choice of a model to release.
The bound is independent of the exact values of the data in the
pool and depends on the data only via the parameter values of
the model. It depends only on the metadata of the model: pool
size n, number of attributesm and model structure G. This implies
that the analysis is robust to varying the details of the dataset, but
it is expressive enough to capture and resolve questions like the
following:
• Which one of many model structures to use for the released
model to minimize leakage?
• What is the additional leakage caused by releasing one more
attribute for each data point in the pool?
• Howdo the dependencies among a certain group of attributes
affect the leakage?
• How exactly does the pool size affect leakage? E.g. if we
double the pool size, will that halve the leakage because the
released model now is trained on twice as many data points?
5.2 Derivation of mean and variance of the
likelihood ratio
We now compute the mean and variance of L(x) under the two
hypotheses. We sketch the proof for the mean E(L) under the pop-
ulation hypothesis, followed by the variance Var(L). Similar calcu-
lations apply for the pool hypothesis.
Let the target x have the feature vector (x1,x2, . . . ,xm ), and let
us assume, for now, that all attributes are binary: xi ∈ {0, 1}, i =
1, . . . ,m. In Appendix D we generalize to attributes that can take
more than two values. We can take advantage of the Bayesian
network decomposition to write the log-likelihood ratio for x as
follows:
L(x) = log
[
Pr(x ; ⟨G,θ⟩)
Pr(x ; ⟨G, θˆ⟩)
]
=
m∑
i=1
Li (11)
where Li is the contribution of Xi to the likelihood ratio, as defined
in (8):
Li = log
©­«
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ;θ ]
Pr[Xi |PaGXi ; θˆ ]
ª®¬
=
∑
v ∈V (PaGXi )
1{PaGXi =v }
(
xi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − xi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
)
︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
Lvi
=
∑
v ∈V (PaGXi )
1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi (12)
where pvi = Pr{Xi = 1|PaGXi = v;θ }, and similarly pˆ
v
i = Pr{Xi =
1|PaGXi = v; θˆ }. The notation 1{PaGXi =v } is an indicator variable
for a particular assignment of values to the parent nodes of Xi , i.e.
1{PaGXi =v }
= 1 if PaGXi = v and 0 otherwise. The sum ranges over
2 |Pa
G
Xi
| terms Lvi , one for each element of V (PaGXi ).
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The parameters θ and θˆ are estimated from data (reference pop-
ulation and pool, respectively). By the central limit theorem, the
distribution of such an estimate converges to a Gaussian around the
mean value of the estimate as the number of data samples increases.
In our derivations of the mean and variance, we use this approxima-
tion in (20) and (21). By the Berry-Esseen theorem [4, 8], the rate of
convergence to the Gaussian is O( 1√
n
) if the third moment of the
random variable being sampled is finite. In our case this condition
is true, because each random variable can only take a finite number
of possible finite values.
We compute the mean and variance of L(x) as follows:
Epop (L) = C2n +O(Cn
−2) (13a)
Epool (L) = −
C
2n +O(Cn
−2) (13b)
Varpop (L) = C
n
+O(C2n−2) (13c)
Varpool (L) =
C
n
+O(C2n−2). (13d)
Proof sketch - Mean under HOUT. The mean Epop (L) can be
computed as follows:
Epop (L) =
m∑
i=1
Epop (Li )
=
m∑
i=1
∑
v
Epop (1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i ) (14)
Using approximation (22) in Appendix Section B, we compute
Epop (1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i ) ≈ 12n +O(n−2). Since the total number of Lvi
parameters is C =
∑m
i=1 2
|PaGXi | , we conclude that
Epop (L) = C2n +O(Cn
−2). (15)
□
Proof sketch - Variance under HOUT. By definition,
Varpop (L) = Epop [L2] − (Epop [L])2. (16)
The latter term (Epop [L])2 is the square of the mean, which we
compute in (15). The former term Epop [L2] decomposes as follows:
Epop [L2] =
m∑
i=1
Epop [L2i ] + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤m
Epop [LiLj ] (17)
We compute Epop [L2i ] by expanding Epop [(
∑
v 1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi )2].
Then, approximation (32) in Appendix C gives us that each square
term Epop [(1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i )2] is approximately equal to 1n |V (PaGXi )|.
As for the product terms in the expansion, each term multiplies
two different indicator variables 1{PaGXi =v }
and 1{PaGXi =v ′ }
with
v , v ′. Because at most one of the two is equal to 1, all product
terms will be zero. Hence Epop [L2i ] = 2
|PaGXi | × 1n .
The number of joint terms Epop [LiLj ] is O(C2). From the ap-
proximation in Appendix Section C.1 for Epop [LiLj ], each of these
terms is equal to 14n2 with error term O(n−2). Hence, the value of
Epop [L2] is
Epop [L2] = C
n
+
C2
4n2
+O(C2n−2). (18)
We conclude that the variance is
Varpop (L) =Epop [L2] − (Epop [L])2
=
C
n
+
C2
4n2
+O(C2n−2) −
(
C
2n +O(Cn
−2)
)2
=
C
n
+O(C2n−2) (19)
□
Although we haven’t provided the calculation here, it is possible
to calculate the exact value of theO(C2n−2) term from the released
model. As a simple example, in appendix E, we calculate the exact
value of this O(C2n−2) term, when the released model is a Naive
Bayes model.
6 EXPERIMENTS
We distinguish three different methods for performing and evaluat-
ing the attack below:
(1) Theoretical: Given a false positive rate and released model
structureG , we use our main result (Theorem 1) to calculate
the power, error, and AUC.
(2) Empirical: In empirical analysis we vary the threshold from
−∞ to +∞ and calculate the power at each value of false
positive rate. This is themaximum possible power that can be
achieved. Hencewe use the power andAUCvalues calculated
here to compare with the bound presented in Theorem 1.
(3) Attack: The adversary has access to some reference popula-
tion. For a given false positive rate, the adversary chooses
the threshold based on the likelihood ratio on the reference
population data. The attacker then runs the LR test tracing
attack.
6.1 Data Sets
A summary of all the data sets which are used in our experiments
is provided in Table 2.
Location: This is a binary data set containing the Foursquare
location check-ins by individuals in Bangkok [21]. Each record cor-
responds to an individual and consists of binary attributes reflecting
visits to different locations.
Purchase: This is a binary data set containing information about
individuals and their purchases [21]. Each record corresponds to
an individual and each attribute represents a product. A value of
1 at attribute j means that the individual purchased the product
corresponding to attribute j.
Genome: OpenSNP is an open source data sharing website,
where people can share their genomic data test results1. We ob-
tained the data provided by OpenSNP and considered only the
individuals sequenced by 23andme. We randomly selected 1000
SNPs on chromosome 1. Individuals with more than 2 missing val-
ues were filtered out. After this pre-processing, we were left with
2497 individuals and 1000 SNPs for each individual. We learn a
1https://opensnp.org/snps
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Data Set # Attributes Original Size Augmented Dataset Size
Location 446 5010 30000
Purchase 600 30000 30000
Genome 1000 2497 10000
Table 2: Summary of Datasets used: For Location and
Genome data, we augment the original dataset with syn-
thetic data using the data synthesis method in Section 2.3,
based on a Bayesian network with η = 3 (see Section 2.1). We
use the full augmented set as the general population.
Data set η No. of Nodes No. of Edges Complexity
Location 0 446 0 446
Location 1 446 343 789
Location 2 446 566 1222
Location 3 446 757 1905
Purchase 0 600 0 600
Purchase 1 600 496 1096
Purchase 2 600 941 1942
Purchase 3 600 1358 3431
Genome 0 1000 0 1000
Genome 1 1000 729 1729
Genome 2 1000 1244 2706
Genome 3 1000 1712 4323
Table 3: Model structures we learned on different datasets,
with different complexities. The structure learning is done
on all the available data. The variable η represents maxi-
mumnumber of parents a node can have in the graph. These
structures are used as G in the experiments.
Bayesian network of complexity 4323 on the real data and use it
to generate synthetic data. After adding synthetic data, we have a
total of 10000 individuals in the dataset.
Bayesian Networks have been used to model genome sequences
in [1], [22]. We use a similar approach to model the SNPs as a
Bayesian Network. Since humans are diploid, at each position we
have 2 bases i.e. 3 possible values. While releasing graphical models
constructed from genomic data, we only estimate the Minor and
Major Allele Frequencies. To calculate the probability of any com-
bination, we assume independence and compute it as the product
of Allele Frequencies.
In all the experiments, the pool and reference population are
sampled independently from the total population. To evaluate the
attack, all the available samples from general population are used
to compute power and false positives. The pool size and reference
population size for experiments with the Location and Purchase
datasets are 3000 and 15000 respectively. The pool size and refer-
ence population size for experiments with the Genome dataset are
1000 and 5000 respectively. We perform each experiment with 50
different and independent splits of pool and reference population
and report the average statistics.
Complexity AUC (Empirical) AUC (Theoretical)
446 0.5928 0.6074
789 0.6337 0.6416
1222 0.6655 0.6741
1905 0.6998 0.7134
Table 4: Area Under Curve for different graphical models
on Location data: Area under curve increases as the model
becomes more complex.
6.2 Validity of theoretical bounds on power
We now compare the observed power of tracing attack with the
bounds provided in Theorem 1. In Figure 1 (columns 2, 3), we
compare the observed power with the theoretical bound. Columns
2 and 3 correspond to releasing Bayesian Networks learned with
η = 0 and η = 3 respectively.
For models with η = 0 (column 2), we can see that the observed
power is much less than the theoretical bound, compared to the
case of η = 3 (column 3). For Location data, the empirical power
exactly matches the bound for both η = 0 and η = 3. The power
of the attack is very small on location data because of the small
number of attributes (446) and the comparatively large pool size
(3000).
When the released model does not capture all the dependen-
cies among attributes in data (under fitted), estimation errors of
parameters in released graphical model become correlated. This
effectively reduces the amount of information available to perform
membership inference. When η = 0, the model cannot capture
any dependency in the data. Hence, the difference between the
observed power and the bound will be larger, which can be seen
in Figure 1 (column 2). As η increases, the model captures more
of the dependencies present in the data. When η = 3, as shown in
Figure 1 (column 3), the observed power is very close to the theo-
retical bound. The observed power of tracing attack becomes
closer to the theoretical bound as the graphical model be-
comes more complex.
6.3 Effect of model complexity on power
In this subsection, we discuss how the complexity of released graph-
ical model affects the power of tracing attack. Figure 1 (column 1)
shows the power of tracing attack when models of various com-
plexities are released. We can observe that, with increasing value
of η, the power of attack increases.
The Area Under Curve of the ROC plot helps quantify the in-
crease in power with complexity in a better way. Tables 4, 5, 6 give
the AUC values of attack on Location, Purchase and Genomes data
respectively. The AUC values are comparatively smaller for the
purchase data set compared to that of the Genomes dataset. This is
because, in case of purchase we only have 600 attributes for a pool
size of 3000. In case of Genomic data, we have 1000 attributes for a
pool size of 1000. Even then, as shown in Table 5 on purchase data,
if a bayesian network with η = 3 is released, we can achieve an AUC
value of approximately 0.75, compared to 0.57 when only marginals
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Figure 1: Power of Attack on Real world data: The effect of model complexity on the power of the attack is shown in the
first column. When graphical models of increasing complexity are released, the power of attack increases, as we have more
parameters that leak information. In the second and third columns, we compare the observed powerswith their corresponding
theoretical bounds. When the model is underfitted, the power achieved will be smaller than the theoretical bound (second
column). As the released model gets closer to the generator distribution, the observed power gets closer to the bound.
are released. We can clearly conclude that with increasing value of
η, the power of tracing attack increases.
When learning the structure of Bayesian Network, higher val-
ues of η result in graphical models with high complexity. Exact
values of complexity for the corresponding η are shown in Table 3.
The complexity of a graphical model represents the number of in-
dependent parameters in the model. Each of these parameters is
learned from individuals in the pool. When Bayesian Networks
of high complexity are learned from limited data, parameters of
network overfit the data more and hence can leak more information
about membership. This additional leakage increases the power of
the tracing attack. The higher the complexity of the released
model, the higher the power of the tracing attack.
Complexity AUC (Empirical) AUC (Theoretical)
600 0.5700 0.6241
1096 0.6266 0.6655
1942 0.6886 0.7153
3431 0.7541 0.7752
Table 5: Area Under Curve for different graphical models
on Purchase data: Area under curve increases as model be-
comes more complex.
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Complexity AUC (Empirical) AUC (Theoretical)
1000 0.6729 0.7602
1729 0.7875 0.8238
2706 0.8495 0.8776
4323 0.9058 0.9292
Table 6: Area Under Curve for different graphical models
on Genome data: As the released model becomes more com-
plex, Area under curve increases and gets closer to theoreti-
cal bound.
6.4 Effect of using complex model as
population model
In this subsection, we present the effect of population model choice
on the power of tracing attack. Specifically, we study the effect
of using models that are more complex than the released model
as population model. The adversary can choose to use either the
released graphical model structure G or a complex model structure
Gpop as population model structure. Figure 2 compares the power
of attack for both the choices of population model. The parameters
of a graphical model ⟨G, θˆ⟩ with η = 1 are learned on the pool data
and released. The adversary has access to a complex and better
representative model ⟨Gpop ,θ⟩ that was learned with η = 3. The
power of the attack is higher when the released model structure
is used as population model structure. The knowledge about ad-
ditional dependencies that are not present in the released graph
structure cannot increase the power of adversary. The optimal
strategy for adversary is to use the released model structure
as population model structure.
6.5 Effect of releasing statistically insignificant
edges
We now analyze the effect on the power of attack of releasing edges
(conditional probabilities) that are statistically insignificant. To
perform this evaluation, we consider the case where the structure
of releasedmodel is not learned from data but generated in a random
way.
Figure 3 compares the power of the attack when two different
models of almost equal complexity are released. The structure of
first model is generated by randomly adding edges and the structure
of second model is learned from data. Adversary uses the released
model as the population model to calculate the LR statistic and
perform tracing attack. We can observe that the power of the attack
in both the cases is similar.
The edges that are generated randomly might not be statistically
significant, but they leak about membership. In the LR Test for
tracing attack, we rely on the difference between probability distri-
butions for pool and population. Adding a statistically insignificant
edge gives similar probability distributions for all configurations of
the parent. Although the conditional probabilities are similar, their
values will be different for pool and population and hence they will
leak about membership. Statistically insignificant edges leak as
much information about membership as significant edges.
6.6 Optimality of the theoretical threshold
In Figure 4, we compare theoretical thresholds for certain false
positive rates with their corresponding values estimated using the
reference population. When η = 0 (row 1), we observe that the
theoretical threshold values are much higher than the estimated
values. When η = 3 (row 2), the observed thresholds are closer to
the estimated values.
When η = 0, the parameter estimation errors are correlated,
which reduces the amount of information leakage. The adversary,
when using the theoretical threshold, overestimates the amount
of leakage (power) and hence chooses a higher threshold. When
η = 3, the released model captures most of the dependencies among
attributes in the data. Hence the observed threshold will be closer to
the theoretical threshold values. From the adversary’s perspec-
tive, the theoretical threshold value is sub-optimal when the
released model is underfitted (loss of utility).
7 RELATEDWORK
Tracing Attacks: Homer et al. [10] developed a statistical test
based on likelihood ratio for inferring the presence of a genome
sequence, given the statistics (Allele frequencies). Sankararaman et
al. [20] extend this work and provide tight bounds on the power of
tracing attack for any adversary. The test statistic in [20] is based on
likelihood ratio. This was further extended for continuous Gaussian
variables (Micro RNA) data in [3].
Dwork et al. [7] take a different approach and provide a generic
framework for tracing attacks based on distance metric, when in-
dependent statistics are released. [7] provides bounds on power of
adversary with different levels of background knowledge ranging
from one reference population sample to infinite reference popu-
lation. In all of [3, 7, 10, 20] the released statistics are assumed to
be independent, whereas our work address the case of releasing
dependent statistics.
[11] perform tracing attacks when regression coefficients from
quantitative phenotypes are released, based on a correlation statistic.
Theoretical bound on maximum power achievable by the adversary
was provided by calculating the distribution of test statistic for
individuals in pool and individuals out of pool.
Shokri et al. [21] perform membership inference attacks against
black box machine learning models. The adversary in [21] con-
structs shadow models that mimic the behaviour of target model.
The attack step is also a machine learning model, which is trained
on data from the shadow models. [19] perform membership infer-
ence on aggregate location data by formulating it as distinguishing
game. These works provide empirical analysis of tracing attack on
complex models. Often this performance depends on the training
data. We present a theoretical bound that is independent of the
training data.
[23] study the connection of privacy loss to overfitting and influ-
ence of a point. Their theoretical analysis suggests that overfitting
is sufficient for membership inference attacks to be possible but it
is not a necessary condition.
Other Privacy Attacks on PGMs: [6] provides a polynomial
time algorithm to reconstruct databases from noisy statistics. [2]
perform inference attacks i.e. reconstruction of hidden attributes
against genomic data by modeling it as a Markov Chain.
9
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
False Positive Rate
P
ow
er
Location
C(G) = 789 Gpop = G
C(Gpop) = 1905 Gpop 6= G
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
False Positive Rate
Purchase
C(G) = 1096 Gpop = G
C(Gpop) = 3431 Gpop 6= G
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
False Positive Rate
Genome
C(G) = 1729 Gpop = G
C(Gpop) = 4323 Gpop 6= G
Figure 2: Effect of using generative model as population model: The parameters of a graphical model ⟨G, θˆ⟩ with η = 1 are
learned on the pool data and the model is released. The adversary has access to a better generative model ⟨Gpop ,θ⟩ with (η = 3).
Plot compares effect of using the better model as population model instead of released model, on power of attack. We can see
that the power of attack reduces when the populationmodel ismore complex than releasedmodel. This shows that knowledge
about additional statistics/dependencies in the data that are not present in the released graphical model, cannot increase the
power of attack. The optimal strategy for adversary is to use the released graph structure as population graph structure.
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Figure 3: Effect of Releasing Graphical Models with Random Edges: Here we compare the power of attack, when two models
of similar complexity learned on the dataset are released but structure of one model is learned from data and the structure
of other is generated randomly. We can see that for close values of C, the power of attack is almost same for both the models.
This shows that statistically insignificant edges leak as much information about membership, as that of significant edges.
Defenses: Differential Privacy has been accepted as the defacto
standard notion of privacy. Zhang et al. [24] learn a Bayesian Net-
work in differentially private way and then use a noisy version of
it to generate synthetic data. [5] proposes a mechanism to generate
synthetic data that is statistically similar to the given input data set.
By definition, differential privacy decreases the power of tracing at-
tack. [16] takes a different approach and train a neural network with
membership privacy by modeling the training process a min-max
privacy game.
Applications of PGM: [1] uses Bayesian Networks to addresses
the problem of classifying hematological malignancies along with
co-expression networks. The Bayesian Network was learned on
gene expression data. Certain dependencies in this learned Bayesian
Network were made public through the paper. [22] discuss the ap-
plicability of Bayesian Networks to model the effect of environ-
ment and genes on diseases. A Bayesian Network model was used
to model bladder cancer study data in [22]. [14] shows the appli-
cability of Bayesian Networks as intelligent tutoring systems by
modeling students. The increasing use of graphical models in sen-
sitive domains, raises the significance of our privacy analysis on
releasing high dimension models learned on private data.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We provide a theoretical framework for tracing attacks to close
the existing gap between theoretical analysis for simple released
models (independent attributes of data samples) and experimen-
tal demonstrations for correlated attributes of data samples. Our
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Figure 4: Effect of releasing underfitted models on threshold selection: This plot compares the threshold values estimated by
the adversary using reference population at different false positive rates with their corresponding theoretical values. The label
Attack indicates that the threshold is estimated by the adversary using reference population. We observe that for underfit
models (η = 0) (first row), the threshold value estimated from the reference population is way less than the corresponding
theoretical value. As the model gets closer to the generator distribution (η = 3) (second row), the estimated threshold values
get closer to the theoretical values.
framework quantifies the maximum attack performance measured
with the error (false positive rate) and power (true positive rate)
of a likelihood-ratio test in the context of probabilistic graphical
models. We experimentally validate and complement our theoreti-
cal results using sensitive datasets - location check-ins, purchase
history, genomic data.
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A NUMBER OF SAMPLES FOR ESTIMATING
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
We use pˆvi to denote the estimated conditional probability that
Xi = 1, given that the values of the activator variables are PaGXi = v .
The number of samples nvi used to compute pˆ
v
i are approximately
Gaussian around npv (n is the pool size, and pv is the probability
of PaGXi = v in the general population):
nvi ≈ npv +
√
npv (1 − pv )Z1, (20)
where Z1 is a standard Gaussian random variable. In parallel, the
value of pˆvi is also approximately Gaussian around the true value
pvi :
pˆvi ≈ pvi +
√
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
Z2, (21)
where Z2 is a standard Gaussian random variable.
Using these two approximations, we now prove the results re-
quired for derivation of LR statistic mean and variance.
B APPROXIMATION FOR MEAN
DERIVATION
As explained in section 5.2, to compute the mean of the likelihood
ratio we need the average contribution of each Lvi i.e. value of
Epop [1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i ]. Here we prove that Epop [1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i ], when
the expectation is over population is approximately equal to 12n .
When expectation is over pool, the derivation steps are similar and
the value is − 12n .
Lemma 1. We will prove the following result:
Epop [1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i ] ≈
1
2n
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
(22)
Proof. We first observe that
Epop [1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i ] =Epˆvi
[
Ex
[
1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi | pˆvi
] ]
=pvEpˆvi
[
pvi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − pvi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
]
,
and now all we need to show is that
EZ1,Z2
[
pvi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − pvi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
]
≈ 12npv
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
(23)
We approximate pˆvi with (21) and we use the Taylor expansion of
log(1 + x) ≈ x − 12x2:
pvi log
pvi
pˆvi
≈ − pvi log
pvi +
√
pvi (1−pvi )
nvi
Z2
pvi
= − pvi log
(
1 +
√
1 − pvi
nvi p
v
i
Z2
)
≈ − pvi
(√
1 − pvi
nvi p
v
i
Z2 −
1 − pvi
2nvi p
v
i
Z 22
)
= −
√
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
Z2 +
1 − pvi
2nvi
Z 22 (24)
Similarly,
(1 − pvi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
≈ −
√
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
Z2 +
pvi
2nvi
Z 22 (25)
Adding (24) and (25), we have
pvi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − pvi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
≈ −2
√
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
Z2 +
1
2nvi
Z 22
(26)
Taking the expectation EZ2 [.], and recalling that E[Z2] = 0 and
E[Z 22 ] = 1, we have
EZ1,Z2
[
pvi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − pvi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
]
=EZ1 [EZ2 [. . . |Z1]]
≈EZ1
[
1
2nvi
]
(27)
We now approximate nvi with (20) and we use the Taylor expan-
sion of 11+x ≈ 1 − x + x2:
1
2nvi
≈ 1
2(npv +
√
npv (1 − pv )Z1)
=
1
2npv
1
1 +
√
1−pv
npv Z1
≈ 12npv
(
1 −
√
1 − pv
npv
Z1 +
1 − pv
npv
Z 21
)
(28)
Taking the expectation EZ1 [.], and recalling that E[Z1] = 0 and
E[Z 21 ] = 1, we have our final result:
EZ1,Z2
[
pvi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − pvi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
]
≈ 12npv
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
□
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C APPROXIMATION FOR VARIANCE
DERIVATION
For calculating the variance of likelihood ratio, we need the ex-
pected values of L2i and LiLj . Here we first prove the below approx-
imation and use it to calculate E(L2i ) and E(LiLj ). As explained in
section 5.2, using these values of E(L2i ) and E(LiLj ) in equation 17
we get the variance of LR statistic.
Lemma 2. We will prove the following approximation:
Epˆvi
[
pvi
(
log
pvi
pˆvi
)2
+ (1 − pvi )
(
log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
)2]
≈ 1
npv
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
(29)
Proof. Using approximation (24)
Epˆvi
[
pvi
(
log
pvi
pˆvi
)2]
≈ EZ1,Z2
[
1
pvi
(
−
√
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
Z2
+
1 − pvi
2nvi
Z 22
)2]
=
1
pvi
EZ1,Z2
[
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
Z 22 +
( 1 − pvi
2nvi
)2
Z 42
−2
√
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
1 − pvi
2nvi
Z 32
]
=
1
pvi
EZ1
[
pvi (1 − pvi )
nvi
+ 3
( 1 − pvi
2nvi
)2]
≈ (1 − pvi )EZ1
[
1
nvi
]
≈ (1 − pvi )EZ1
[
1
npv
(
1 −
√
1 − pv
npv
Z1 +
1 − pv
npv
Z 21
)]
=
1 − pvi
npv
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
(30)
Similar to (30), we have:
Epˆvi
[
(1 − pvi )
(
log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
)2]
≈ p
v
i
npv
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
(31)
The desired result follows. □
C.1 Approximation of Epop [L2i ]
We approximate Epop [L2i ] as:
Epop [L2i ] =Epop

(∑
v
1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi
)2
=Epˆvi
E

(∑
v
1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi
)2pˆvi


=
∑
v
pv Epˆvi [(L
v
i )2]
=
∑
v
pv Epˆvi
[
pvi
(
log
pvi
pˆvi
)2
+ (1 − pvi )
(
log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
)2]
≈
∑
v
1
n
(
1 + 1 − pv
npv
)
(from approximation (29))
=
1
n
|V (PaGXi )| +
1
n2
∑
v
1 − pv
pv
(32)
Combining the definition of complexity (2) with equation (32),
we have:
m∑
i=1
Epop [L2i ] ≈
C
n
+
1
n2
m∑
i=1
∑
v
1 − pv
pv
(33)
C.2 Approximation of Epop [LiLj ]
There are three possible cases while finding the value of E[LiLj ].
The random variables Xi and X j might not have any common
parents, might have some common parents or one is the parent of
other. We start with the case in which Xi and X j have no common
parents. Let p(vi ,vj ) represent the joint probability of PaGXi = vi
and PaGX j = vj .
Epop [LiLj ] =Epop

(∑
v
1{PaGXi =vi }
Lvi
) ©­«
∑
vj
1{PaGXj =vj }
Lvj
ª®¬

=Epop

∑
vi ,vj
1{PaGXi =vi }
1{PaGXj =vj }
Lvi L
v
j

=
∑
vi ,vj
Epop
[
1{PaGXi =vi }
1{PaGXj =vj }
Lvi L
v
j
]
=
∑
vi ,vj
p(vi ,vj )Epop
[
Lvi L
v
j
]
≈
∑
vi ,vj
p(vi ,vj ) × 12npvi
× 12npvj
(from (23))
=
∑
vi ,vj
1
4n2
× p(vi ,vj )
pvipvj
(34)
In the case where Xi and X j have common parents Si j , let Si
represent the parents exclusive to Xi and Sj represent parents
exclusive to X j . Let p(vi ,vj ,vi j ) represent the joint probability
of PaGXi = vi and Pa
G
X j
= vj and common parent of Xi and X j ,
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PaGXi, j
= vi j .
Epop [LiLj ] =Epop
©­«
∑
vi ,vi j
1{PaGXi =vi }
1{PaGXi j =vi j }
Lvi
ª®¬©­«
∑
vj ,vi j
1{PaGXj =vj }
1{PaGXi j =vi j }
Lvj
ª®¬

=Epop

∑
vi ,vj ,vi j
1{PaGXi =vi }
1{PaGXj =vj }
1{PaGXi j =vi j }
Lvi L
v
j
]
=
∑
vi ,vj ,vi j
p(vi ,vj ,vi j )Epop
[
Lvi L
v
j
]
≈
∑
vi ,vj ,vi j
p(vi ,vj ,vi j ) × 12np(vi ,vi j )
× 12np(vj ,vi j ) (from (23))
=
∑
vi ,vj ,vi j
1
4n2
× p(vi ,vj ,vi j )
p(vi ,vi j )p(vj ,vi j ) (35)
In the case where X j is a parent of Xi ,
Epop [LiLj ] =Epop

(∑
vi
1{PaGXi =vi }
x jL
v
i
) ©­«
∑
vj
1{PaGXj =vj }
Lvj
ª®¬

=Epop

∑
vi ,vj
1{PaGXi =vi }
1{PaGXj =vj }
x jL
v
i
(
x j log
pvj
pˆvj
)
=
∑
vi ,vj
p(vi ,vj ,x j )Epop
[
Lvi log
pvj
pˆvj
]
≈
∑
vi ,vj
p(vi ,vj ,x j ) × 12np(vi ,x j )
×
1 − pvj
2npvj
(from (23))
=
∑
vi ,vj
1 − pvj
4n2
× p(vi ,vj ,x j )
p(vi ,x j )pvj
(36)
D GENERIC CATEGORICAL VARIABLE
In this section, we generalize our results to any categorical vari-
ables (not just binary). The extension from binary to categorical is
straightforward.Wewill have a similar expression for the likelihood
ratio statistic:
L(x) = log
(
Pr(x ; ⟨G,θ⟩)
Pr(x ; ⟨G, θˆ⟩)
)
=
m∑
i=1
Li ,
where Li is the contribution of Xi to LR:
Li =
∑
v
1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi
Instead of writing Lvi as
Lvi = xi log
pvi
pˆvi
+ (1 − xi ) log
1 − pvi
1 − pˆvi
we write
Lvi =
∑
o∈V (Xi )
1{xi=o } log
pvio
pˆvio
,
pvio = Pr(xi = o |PaGXi = v)
Now,
Epop [Lvi ] =
∑
o∈V (Xi )
E
[
pvio log
pvio
pˆvio
]
=
∑
o∈V (Xi )
1 − pvio
2nvi
(from (24))
=
|V (Xi )| − 1
2nvi
(37)
Epop [Li ] =
∑
v
E[1{PaGXi =v }L
v
i |PaGXi = v]
=
∑
v
Epˆvi
[
Ex
[
1{PaGXi =v }
Lvi | pˆvi
] ]
=
∑
v
pv
|V (Xi )| − 1
2nvi
(from (37))
=
∑
v
|V (Xi )| − 1
2n +O(n
−2) (from (28))
=|V (PaXi )| ×
|V (Xi )| − 1
2n +O(n
−2)
Epop [LR] =
m∑
i=1
Epop [Li ]
≈
m∑
i=1
|V (PaXi )| ×
|V (Xi )| − 1
2n +O(n
−2)
=
C
2n +O(Cn
−2)
Hence,
Epop [LR] = C2n +O(Cn
−2) (38)
Similarly for deriving variance we have,
Epop [(Lvi )2] =
∑
o∈V (Xi )
E
[
pvio
(
log
pvio
pˆvio
)2]
=
∑
o∈V (Xi )
1 − pvio
nvi
(from (30))
=
|V (Xi )| − 1
nvi
(39)
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Epop [L2i ] =
∑
v
E[1{PaGXi =v }(L
v
i )2 |PaGXi = v]
=
∑
v
Epˆvi
[
Ex
[
1{PaGXi =v }
(Lvi )2 | pˆvi
] ]
=
∑
v
pv
|V (Xi )| − 1
nvi
(from (39))
=
∑
v
|V (Xi )| − 1
n
+O(n−2) (from (28))
=|V (PaXi )| ×
|V (Xi )| − 1
n
+O(n−2)
Hence,
m∑
i=1
Epop [L2i ] =
m∑
i=1
|V (PaXi )| ×
|V (Xi )| − 1
n
+O(n−2)
=
C
n
+O(Cn−2)
Varpop (L) =Epop [L2] − (Epop [L])2
Epop [L2] =
m∑
i=1
E[L2i ] + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤m
E[LiLj ]
Similar to the derivations of
∑
Epop [Li ] and ∑Epop [L2i ], we will
have
∑
i, j
Epop [LiLj ] = C
2
4n2
+O(C2n−2)
Hence, for categorical variables:
Varpop [LR] =C
n
+O(C2n−2) (40)
E NAIVE BAYES
In section 5.2, while deriving the variance, we haven’t calculated
the exact value of the O(C2n−2) term. From the released model, it
is possible to calculate the exact value of this term. Here we derive
the exact value of theO(C2n−2) term, when the released model is a
Naive Bayes model. Let the number of attributes in the model be
equal tom. Hence, the complexity of the model is C = 2m − 1. Let
X1 be the class variable and p1i = Pr (Xi = 1|X1 = 1). Then, using
equation (23) we have:
Epop (L) = Epop
[
x1 log
p1
pˆ1
+ (1 − x1) log 1 − p11 − pˆ1
+x1
m∑
i=2
(
xi log
p1i
pˆ1i
+ (1 − xi ) log
1 − p1i
1 − pˆ1i
)
+(1 − x1)
m∑
i=2
(
xi log
p0i
pˆ0i
+ (1 − xi ) log
1 − p0i
1 − pˆ0i
)]
=
1
2n +
m∑
i=2
[
p1 × 12np1 +
1
2n2
[
1 − p1
p1
] ]
+
m∑
i=2
[
(1 − p1) × 12n(1 − p1) +
1
2n2
[
p1
1 − p1
] ]
=
2m − 1
2n +O(mn
−2)
=
C
2n +O(Cn
−2) (41)
We can calculate the exact value of Epop (L2) using the equations
(29), (35) and (36) as below :
Epop (L2) = Epop
[ [
x1 log
p1
pˆ1
+ (1 − x1) log 1 − p11 − pˆ1
+ x1
m∑
i=2
(
xi log
p1i
pˆ1i
+ (1 − xi ) log
1 − p1i
1 − pˆ1i
)
+ (1 − x1)
m∑
i=2
(
xi log
p0i
pˆ0i
+(1 − xi ) log
1 − p0i
1 − pˆ0i
)]2
=
1
n
+
m∑
i=2
[
p1 × 1
np1
+
1
n2
[
1 − p1
p1
] ]
+
m∑
i=2
[
(1 − p1) × 1
n(1 − p1) +
1
n2
[
p1
1 − p1
] ]
+ 2
[(
m − 1
2
)
× p1
4n2pˆ21
+
(
m − 1
2
)
× 1 − p1
4n2(1 − pˆ1)2
+
(m − 1)(1 − p1)
4n2
+
(m − 1)(p1)
4n2
]
=
2m − 1
n
+
(m − 1)(m − 2)
4n2
[
p1
pˆ21
+
1 − p1
(1 − pˆ1)2
]
+O(mn−2)
≈ C
n
+
m2
4n2
[
1
p1(1 − p1)
]
+O(mn−2) (42)
Combining equations (41) and (42), we have the variance for
Naive Bayes as:
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Varpop (L) = Epop (L2) − (Epop (L))2
=
C
n
+
m2
4n2
[
1
p1(1 − p1) − 4
]
+O(mn−2)
≈ C
n
+O(C2n−2) (43)
F FISHER INFORMATION - PARAMETER
ESTIMATION
Fisher information quantifies the amount of information a ran-
dom variable carries about the parameter(s) θ of the probability
distribution from which it is generated.
I (θ ) = −Eθ (∇2l(θ )),
where I (θ ) is Fisher information, and l(θ ) is the log-likelihood func-
tion for θ .
If θˆ is a Maximum Likelihood Estimate of θ , then it is known
that
θˆ = Normal(θ , I (θˆ )−1).
The log-likelihood functions of parameter θ from a PGM ⟨G,θ⟩,
given a sample x are typically of the form:
l(θ ) = log [Pr(x ; ⟨G,θ⟩)]
=
m∑
i=1
li
where li is contribution of Xi to the likelihood function:
li =
∑
v ∈V (PaGXi )
1{PaGXi =v }
lvi
lvi =
∑
o∈V (Xi )
1{xi=o } logp
v
io
l =
∑
i,v,o
fi,v,o (x1,x2, . . . ,xm ) log(pvio ),
where fi,v,o are activator functions (some combination of xi ’s) for
the parameter pvio .
I (p) = −Ep (∇2l(p))
All the non-diagonal elements of the information matrix are zero,
because:
∂
∂pvio
∂
∂pvjo
[
∑
i,v,o
fi,v,o (x1,x2, . . . ,xm ) log(pvio )] = 0,∀i , j
This implies that all the standard normal variables used to represent
frequencies in pool are pair-wise independent i.e. all estimation
errors are independent. The power for inference is provided by
finite sample estimation error. These two facts together explain
why the complexity of a PGM equals to the number of independent
parameters required to define probability distribution of the graph.
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